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*

2004] PRESCRIBING THE RIGHT DOSE OF PEER REVIEW
I.

399

INTRODUCTION

Environmental law stands out among all fields of law as the one
most concerned with the physical world around us. This distinction is
both a great appeal and a heavy burden. If environmental law has
done anything in the epistemological sense, it has taught us how little
we know about the physical world and, even more so, how little we
know about how to improve the physical world through law. Alas, environmental law seems puny and confused compared to its intended
beneficiary, and we have made many mistakes as it has developed.
The history of water management offers no shortage of examples in
that respect.
Lately, however, we hear much about science coming to the rescue
of environmental law. The so-called "sound science" movement claims
to be able to improve decisionmaking under environmental law-to
make it more rational and objective by infusing the field with more
and better practice of science. 2 Of course, I am not about to argue
against sound science, 3 whatever it means, as it is a loaded term that
2. See David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint:The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

497, 498 (2004) ("[S]chisms exist over how science is used in setting environmental policy. For most critics of environmental regulation, broad reliance on science
is viewed as progress towards increased rationality and objectivity."). The discussion and debate regarding the use of"sound science" in environmental law is pervasive-I found over 2600 websites through a Google search of "'sound science'"
AND 'environmental law.'" Many observers trace the origins of the "sound science" movement to the Phillip Morris Corporation's creation in 1993 of The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition ("TASSC"). See Elsia K. Ong & Stanton A.
Glantz, Constructing "Sound Science" and "Good Epidemiology:"Tobacco, Lawyers, and Public Relations Firms, 91 Am.J. PuB. HEALTH 1749 (2001). Now defunct, TASSC was formed initially to assemble and propagate counter-evidence of
tobacco's effects on human health, but later was funded by a wider variety of
corporations. Although TASSC officially has disbanded, the "sound science"
movement lives on. See JunkScience.com: All the Junk That's Fit to Debunk, at
http://www.junkscience.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2004). Indeed, the movement
now enjoys substantial political cachet. The Bush Administration has aggressively advanced "sound science" principles, such as data quality. See, e.g., Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22,
2002). Legislative proposals routinely use the "sound science" label to gain support. See, e.g., Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003,
H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (2003). A counter-movement also has emerged. For example, a group of legal scholars openly skeptical of its motives has formed to,
among other things, monitor and challenge the "sound science" movement. See
Center for Progressive Regulation, at http://www.progressiveregulation.orglindex.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003). The Bush Administration strongly challenges their assertion that the "sound science" movement inherently politicizes
the use of sound science. See David Malakoff, White House Rebuts ChargesIt Has
Politicized Science, 304 SCIENCE 184 (2004).
3. I use the term here and elsewhere without bracketing it in quote marks to refer
to practices that the scientific community in general would regard as appropriate
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almost begs a fight. Who is for unsound science? Not I-but I am for
a sound approach to sound science. Maybe sound science is good for
environmental law, but we all know that too much of a good thing can
be bad. So, I ask, could sound science, depending on how it is dosed
out to environmental law, be counterproductive?
I am by no means the first to ask this question, or to suggest as I
do, that the answer is yes.4 But I wish to focus on the one component
of sound science that is most often held out as the panacea by some
and the problem by others: peer review. To be more precise, what I
examine here is whether scientific-style peer review, depending on
how it is dosed out, could be counterproductive for environmental law.
The use of peer review as a component of regulatory procedure has
not received much discrete attention in environmental law literature, 5
but it is truly the sleeping dog of the "sound science" movement. Understanding this concept requires some background on science and administrative law. The "sound science" movement, as its name
suggests, advocates that environmental law decisions be based principally on scientific information and conclusions that have been derived
through the rigorous, unbiased practice of science. Science is generally regarded as a formalized system for gathering and evaluating information about the world in which prescribed methods of
observation, communication, informed criticism, and response must
use of the scientific method for the given scientific inquiry. I place the term in
quotes when I wish to refer to the policy-based movement-some would say ideology-based movement-advocating more use of any or all of scientific practices in
administrative decisions required under environmental laws. For example, peer
review is unquestionably a practice of sound science, as well as a cornerstone of
the "sound science" movement. I do not question for a moment the consequences
of the former proposition; rather, my focus is entirely on the latter.
4. For a historical perspective on the use of science in environmental law, referencing a wealth of literature on the topic and suggesting several "cautionary tales"
about the promotion of using more "good science," see Oliver Houck, Tales from a
Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCIENCE 1926
(2003). Professor Wendy Wagner has produced the most extensive body of work
examining the claim for using more and better science in environmental law. See
Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the
Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2003); Wendy Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental
Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade
in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
5. For a general discussion of the role of peer review in regulatory law, see Lars
Noah, Scientific "Republicanism":Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation,49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1045 (2000). More directly, Professor Sidney Shapiro has recently examined proposals the Bush Administration has
advanced regarding peer review in federal agencies, which are discussed infra.
See Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,064 (2004).
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be carefully followed.6 If these steps work for science, so goes the argument, they should work for environmental law as well.
One difficulty the "sound science" movement faces, however, is that
many of the methodological components of science are already firmly
embedded in environmental law through basic standards of administrative law prescribed under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").7 A scientist would be accused of practicing unsound science
in research if he or she declared that relevant data was ignored or
altered in reaching the research conclusion simply because the data
did not support the conclusion. 8 Likewise, an agency would be chastised for doing the same in reaching the decision of a rulemaking or an
adjudication-that conduct would be arbitrary and capricious, such
that any court acting on judicial review of the decision would know to
strike it down as a violation of the APA.9 A court would not need to
employ the principles of sound science to get to such a ruling.
6. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1057-64 (1997).
Professor Doremus, a trained biologist and leading environmental law scholar,
provides a concise summary of the scientific method:
Procedurally, science is a formalized system for gathering and evaluating information about the world. Its essential steps are observation,
communication, informed criticism, and response. A scientist gathers
data through observation or experimental manipulation. She then communicates those data, together with an explanation of the methods used
to gather them, to the community of scientists in her field. The scientific
community reviews and critiques the work, commenting in ways that
may inspire the original scientist and others to seek additional data or
alternative explanations.
Id. at 1057.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Gretchen Vogel et al., Ecologists Roiled by Misconduct Case, 303 SciENCE 606 (2004) (reporting developments concerning allegations that a world-renowned ecologist fabricated data in a published study of genetic fitness traits).
9. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983) [State Farm] (holding the revocation of a motor vehicle
safety standard arbitrary and capricious where agency 'failed to present an adequate basis and explanation"). These rules require the courts to apply considerable deference to the agency's decision. A reviewing court may not substitute its
judgment for the agency, but must undertake a "thorough, probing, in-depth review" of the agency's decision. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). Thus, a court will reject an agency's decision if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249,
1252 (10th Cir. 1998). An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the
agency either "has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise," State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, or if it has failed to
"articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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Indeed, even statute-specific references to using science in regulatory contexts add little, if anything, to this feature of administrative
law. For example, although the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")1o
ominously requires that many decisions called for under the statute be
based on the "best scientific data available,"11 there is no evidence
that this standard has made a bit of difference in terms of how agency
decisions are examined in judicial review settings.12 Courts do not
implement the ESA standard in ways that add anything beyond the
demands that are already placed on the decisionmaker under the
APA.
The "sound science" movement thus has a difficult time articulating exactly what it seeks when it comes to methodological matters
such as data quality, because many of the sound practices of science
already are required of agencies in some degree or another. What is
sound science supposed to add? To be sure, one can envision requiring
that agencies take additional steps to assure the public about such
matters as data quality-in essence, enforcing sound science by mandating more science procedure-but it is simply not the case that the
substantive demand for data quality is something new that the "sound
science" movement brings to the table for environmental law.
By contrast, peer review is a practice of science that is neither specifically required by most environmental laws, nor generally required
through the default administrative law doctrines of the APA. Peer review is generally described as a scientifically rigorous review and critique of a study's methods, results, and findings that is conducted by
others in the relevant field who have the requisite training and expertise, who have no pecuniary or other disqualifying bias with respect to
the topic, and who are independent of the persons who performed the
study.13 Public participation in regulatory decisions through notice
10. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000). For extensive discussions of this requirement,
see Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 2002 WL 1733618, at *8 (D.
D.C. 2002) (summarizing the existing body of case law); Laurence Michael Bogert, That's My Story and I'm Stickin to It: Is the "Best Available" Science Any
Available Science Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 85
(1994); Michael J. Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of
the "Best Scientific Data Available" Standardin the EndangeredSpecies Act, 16
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 409-12 (2003); Holly Doremus, The Purposes,Effects, and
Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34
ENVTL. L. 397 (2004) [hereinafter Doremus, Best Science Mandate]; Doremus,
supra note 6, at 1051-85; John Earl Duke, Giving Species the Benefit of the
Doubt, 83 B.U. L. REV. 209 (2003).
12. See J.B. Ruhl, The Battle Over EndangeredSpecies Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L.
555 (2004) (reviewing legislative history and judicial and administrative implementation of the ESA's best science mandate).
13. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMIES, PEER REVIEW IN ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 2 (1998), available at http://www.nap.edu
books/0309063388/html/index.html. A peer is "a person having technical exper-
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and comment in rulemakings or representation in adjudicatory proceedings does not serve this role, as it does not screen out biased members of the public and is not limited to experts.14 Judicial review of
agency decisions does not ensure the same level of expertise that can
be provided in peer review, and in any event judges must adhere to
the review standards of the APA, not those of scientific peer review.15
Peer review, in other words, is the one thing the "sound science" movement has that administrative law does not already demand.
Peer review is a practice most strongly associated with scientific
journal publication decisions, where it has been in use for over 300
years and widely employed for over 200 years, but it also applies in a
wide array of settings, including, most prominently, grant-funding decisions and faculty and student evaluations. 1 6 Within science, peer
review is widely considered "essential to the integrity of scientific and
scholarly communication."'7 For many scientists, indeed, peer review
"does not merely reflect the scientific method, it is the scientific
method."' 8
The "sound science" movement thus holds out peer review as an
immutable component of environmental decisionmaking through the
following syllogism:
Premise 1: The practice of sound science is an essential component of many decisions required by environmental
law.
Premise 2: Peer review is an essential component of the practice of sound science.
Conclusion: Therefore, peer review is an essential component
of those environmental law decisions for which
sound science is an essential component.
The Bush Administration certainly acts as if this is an ironclad
proposition, proposing that federal agencies broadly employ more rigorous peer review in their decisionmaking processes. 19 Indeed, on its

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

tise in the subject matter to be reviewed (or a subset of the subject matter to be
reviewed) to a degree at least equivalent to that needed for the original work." Id.
at 28. The peer's independence from the work being reviewed "means that the
peer, a) was not involved as a participant, supervisor, technical reviewer, or advisor in the work being reviewed, and b) to the extent practical, has sufficient freedom from funding considerations to assure the work is impartially reviewed." Id.
See Noah, supra note 5, at 1074-76.
See Noah, supra note 5, at 1076-77.
See ANN C. WELLER, EDITORIAL PEER REVIEw: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
1-7 (2001).
Id. at 322.
Noah, supra note 5, at 1045.
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,230 (Apr. 28, 2004)
[hereinafter OMB, Revised Bulletin] ("peer review improves both the quality of
scientific information and the public's confidence in the integrity of science"); Of-
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surface this argument appears unassailable-if peer review is part of
sound science, which it is, and sound science is part of environmental
decisionmaking in many instances, which it is, ought not peer review
be a part of environmental decisionmaking? But the answer is: not
necessarily.
What the argument fails to reveal is that, even with respect to environmental decisions for which sound science is an essential component, sound science is not the only essential component. This is
because science, even sound science; usually does not lead to compelling answers about the questions posed in environmental law. Indeed,
it frequently leads in no particular direction at all. 20 Sound science
could produce a mountain of relevant data of the highest quality and
still provide no clues as to what to do for purposes of the environmental law decision. In at least those cases something else will be needed
in order to reach decisions, such as sound judgment by agency
decisionmakers, sound procedures for weighing alternatives, sound
methods of providing public information and soliciting public views,
and even sound politics. Even when science does produce robust results, in many value-laden societal decisionmaking contexts scientific
findings simply are not all that matter. In short, "decisionmaking is
often driven by a variety of nonscientific, adversarial, and stakeholder
dynamics. Thus, even though science helps inform choices, it is only
one of many values and interests considered by each stakeholder."21
Thus, there are many ingredients to sound decisionmaking in environmental law, with sound science being only one among them. But
advocates of using more peer review in environmental regulation decisions are likely to observe that this argument alone does not refute the
case on behalf of including peer review, for it does not demonstrate
why peer review should ever be left out of the package even if other
components of sound science are. Particularly because peer review is
the one element of sound science not already incorporated at some
level or another through administrative law rules, advocates may argue that it should be the last to be excluded from the "sound science"
mix for environmental law.
Nevertheless, the complexity of environmental decisionmaking will
rarely allow us to practice all of the ingredients of decisionmaking to
their "soundest" degrees. Even where time and money would allow
fice of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Proposed Bulletin on
Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024 (Sept. 15,
2003) [hereinafter OMB, Proposed Bulletin] ("Independent, objective peer review
has long been regarded as a critical element in ensuring the reliability of scientific analyses."). The proposal is discussed infra note 35, section IVA, and accompanying text.
20. See Doremus, supra note 6, at 1065-82.
21. Herman A. Karl & Christine E. Turner, IncorporatingScience into Decision-Mak-

ing, 300

SCIENCE

1370 (2003).
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the possibility of engaging in any one of the ingredients to the highest
standards, there will be cases in which attempting to do so for all at
the same time would pose conflicting constraints between the respective ingredients. For example, at some point the quest for relevant,
reliable, and reviewed data may add too much time to the decisionmaking process-such as the decision whether a species is endangered-that the policy effectiveness of the decision is impeded. What
a hollow victory for sound science it would be, for example, to spend so
much time ensuring the reliability of the data proving the species is
endangered, that the species is already extinct by the time the decision to protect it is made. Adding time and budget constraints to the
picture amplifies the prospect and potential intensity of these conflicting constraints. Sound decisionmaking, in other words, may require
that we practice all of the decisionmaking components, including
sound science, at, say, only eighty percent of their respective "soundest" levels.22
Taking this phenomenon of conflicting constraints to heart, the
central thesis of this Article is that, of all the components of sound
science, peer review presents one of the highest potentials for triggering conflicting constraints with other components of sound decisionmaking. I examine this quality of peer review using the Endangered
Species Act as a case study for this symposium's principal topic of
water management. 23 The ESA, perhaps more than any other environmental law, has become a lightning rod of controversy in water

22. For discussion of the conflicting constraints property of complex systems, and of
regulatory systems in particular, see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and
the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State,
91 GEO. L.J. 757, 806-12 (2003). Evolutionary biologists have long observed the
effects of conflicting constraints on the fitness of different species in different environments-i.e., traits improving fitness in one environment may reduce fitness
in others. See Santiago F. Elena & Rafael Sanju~n, Climb Every Mountain?, 302
SCIENCE 2074 (2003) (description of "fitness landscapes" depicting the traits
tradeoff problem); Elizabeth Pennisi, The Primate Bite: Brawn Versus Brain?,
303 SCIENCE 1957 (2004) (discussing the hypothesis that nonhuman primates'
massive jaw muscles, useful in forage and combat, limited the growth of their
brains).
23. This Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA.
Rather, it focuses attention on programs and features of the statute for which
questions of methodology bear particular importance. For comprehensive treat-

ments of the ESA, several of which are referred to frequently infra, see ENDAN-

GERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & Win.
Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES]; LAWRENCE
R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, ENDANGERED SPECIES
DESKBOOK (2003); STANFORD ENVTL. LAW Soc'Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(2001) [hereinafter SELS]; TONY A. SULLINS, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001);
and MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997).
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management contexts. 24 At the same time, the ESA has also become
the poster child for the "sound science" movement, and for the peer
review argument in particular. The role and consequence of peer review under the ESA, in other words, will have much to say about the
resolution of water management issues in many parts of the nation.
Using this confluence of themes, I lay out my thesis in three steps.
Part II of the Article provides some background on the "medicine,"
peer review, as it is prescribed in regulatory contexts in general-i.e.,
what is it and why do it? I conclude that, as a general proposition,
there is no a priorireason to reject the use of regulatory peer review in
administration of the ESA-i.e., a closer examination of the ESA and
the potential effects of peer review is necessary.
Part III thus provides the diagnosis of the "patient," the ESA. The
ESA is a science-driven law, which suggests peer review may fit, but it
is also a policy-driven law for which many policy questions have no
definitive scientific solution. In such a context, whether peer review
adds or detracts from policy outcomes is a matter of fitting the timing
and size of the dose to the diagnosis of the ESA.
Part IV of the Article then describes the three conflicts that unrestrained doses of regulatory peer review pose for ESA decisionmaking
in particular, and for environmental law and water management generally. First, because its advocates regularly overstate what peer review will accomplish for environmental law decisionmaking,
mandating peer review across the board raises unrealistic expecta24. See, e.g., Antonio Rossman, A New Law and the "Eraof Limits" on the Colorado,
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 4 (2003) (statutes such as the ESA create a "New
Law of the River" that "adds to the proprietary determinations of the old [water
use] law the jurisprudence that defines and enforces the nonproprietary rights of
the commons and public domain"); William Stelle, Jr., Implementing ESA
Salmon Listings-Untangling Overlapping Programs, 16 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 112, 112 (2001) ("The major listings of salmon, steelhead, and bull trout
across a wide swath of the Pacific states ... have created a unique overlay of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) on both urban and rural populations .. . [and]
placed enormous strains on an already complex and poorly integrated set of programs pertaining to aquatic health. . ").
Recently, at the American Bar Association's 2004 Annual Conference on
Water Law, a federal official summed up the growing influence of the ESA by
observing that "federal environmental law represents a major insertion into a
structure that did not take it into consideration" and identifying the ESA as a
"law that calls into question current water uses by focusing on their environmental qualities." See Stephen Siciliano, Official Says Endangered Species Act Altering Balanceof Water Uses in West, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA), Feb. 24, 2004, at A-6
(quoting Robert Lohn, Northwest Reg'l Comm'r, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.).
At the same conference, a noted ESA citizen suit attorney explained that "when
we use the Endangered Species Act, we are trying to create incentives to change
the status quo" of water use in the West. See Stephen Siciliano, Officials, Environmental Attorney Debate Utility of Litigation in Silvery Minnow Case, DAILY
ENV'T REP. (BNA), Feb. 24, 2004, at A-7 (quoting Laird Lucas, Executive Dir.,
Advocates for the West).
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tions of the quality of agency decisions and weakens the position of
other important components of decisionmaking. Second, inflexibly
mandating rigorous peer review adds substantial demands on agency
resources, potentially draining resources from other decisionmaking
components and, in many cases, impeding decisionmaking altogether.
Finally, peer review is subject to abuse if it is implemented in ways
that allow agencies to manipulate the process and thereby rig outcomes so as to justify agency decisions that would not withstand legitimate peer scrutiny. Peer review, in other words, can be prescribed at
overdose levels for the ESA, and environmental law generally, even
though it is an essential component of sound science.
So, what is the right dose? In Part V of the Article, I continue to
use the ESA as a model for exploring ways peer review could be incorporated into environmental laws so as to retain its value while minimizing its potential adverse effects. One approach is to identify
criteria which, when present, suggest that a particular decision could
benefit from rigorous "microscope" peer review, with the idea being
that the criteria would screen out most cases so as to produce a limited
set of cases justifying substantial expenditure of resources for peer review. Another approach is to develop an independent peer review
"SWAT team" that would conduct random peer reviews of agency decisions more frequently than the "microscope" style, but less intensely
in each case, with the idea being to derive much of the decisionmaking
quality incentives peer review can produce without suffocating overall
agency practice. These uses of peer review would substantially reduce
the potential for conflicting constraints while still allowing environmental law to reap most of its benefit. More potent doses of peer review, I contend, offer little incremental benefit but risk significant
adverse effects.
Arguing against broad use of peer review in environmental law invites accusations of trying to hide the flaws of agency practice in the
shadow of "agency expertise." Advocates of peer review contend that
it is the light that will expose those flaws. But while that is indeed the
purpose of peer review in science, I question whether those who advocate it unyieldingly for the ESA and throughout environmental law
really have that purpose in mind. The optimal use of peer review in
environmental law, I contend, is not all the way all of the time, but in
the right dose at the right time. The sound use of sound science demands nothing less than a careful approach to writing that
prescription.
II.

THE MEDICINE: WHAT IS REGULATORY PEER REVIEW
AND WHY DO IT?

Most scientific peer review takes place in the context of journal
publication and grant award decisions. Procedurally, in this and simi-
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lar settings, the journal or granting institution acts as a "middleman"
to find independent reviewers with relevant expertise who will review
the science, not the scientists. The journal review process, for example, has been summarized as follows:
An aspiring author sends a manuscript to a journal's editorial office. The journal editor, or for large journals one of the associate editors, logs in the manuscript, selects two or three reviewers to evaluate the manuscript, and sends
each a copy. Reviewers are asked to assess the manuscript and make a recommendation to accept, accept with revisions, or reject tie manuscript. The editor or associate editors then decide if they will accept the recommendation of
25
the reviewers.

Grant-funding peer review follows a similar process. 2 6 In both
cases variations exist with respect to whether the journal or grant institution uses reviewers from a standing board or selects reviewers
from a list compiled by recommendations. 27 Also, although most peer
review is merely anonymous, meaning the author does not know the
identity of the reviewers, some journals and grant institutions use
"blind" review, in which the reviewers also do not know the identity of

25. WELLER, supra note 16, at 1. See also FYTTON ROWLAND, THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS: A REPORT TO THE JISC SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATIONS GROUP 1 (2002), available at http://www.jisc.ac.uk/uploaded-documents/rowland.pdf (JISC is the Joint
Information Systems Committee, the UK's higher education support agency.).
When a submitted report first arrives at the editorial office of a journal, it is first
vetted by the editor, who may reject it out of hand-either because it is "out of
scope" (not dealing with the right subject matter for that journal) or because it is
manifestly of such low quality that it cannot be considered at all. Papers that
pass this first hurdle are then sent to experts in the field of the paper-usually
two-who are generally asked to classify the paper as publishable immediately,
publishable with amendments and improvements, or not publishable.
26. For example, the National Science Foundation ("NSF") advises persons submitting grant proposals as follows:
Proposals received by the NSF Proposal Processing Unit are assigned
to the appropriate NSF program for acknowledgement and, if they meet
NSF requirements, for review. All proposals are carefully reviewed by a
scientist, engineer, or educator serving as an NSF Program Officer, and
usually by three to ten other persons outside NSF who are experts in the
particular fields represented by the proposal. Proposers are invited to
suggest names of persons they believe are especially well qualified to
review the proposal and/or persons they would prefer not review the proposal. These suggestions may serve as one source in the reviewer selection process at the Program Officer's discretion. Program Officers may
obtain comments from assembled review panels or from site visits before
recommending final action on proposals. Senior NSF staff further review recommendations for awards.
OFFICE OF BUDGET, FIN., & AWARD MGMT., NAT'L Sci. FOUND., NSF 03-041, GRANT
PROPOSAL GUIDE 35 (June 2003), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2003/
nsf03041/nsf03_041.pdf.
27. See WELLER, supra note 16, at 2.
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the authors. 28 These procedures "have been championed to help reduce any reviewer bias."29
Substantively, the peer review process is far from a "de novo" review, to borrow from a legal model, but rather more like appellate review. The journal Ecology, for example, advises its reviewers that
their comments should address ten factors: (1) importance and interest to this journal's readers; (2) scientific soundness; (3) originality; (4)
degree to which conclusions are supported; (5) organization and clarity; (6) cohesiveness of argument; (7) length relative to information
content; (8) whether material should be moved to the digital appendices; (9) conciseness and writing style; and (10) appropriateness for the
targeted journal and specific section of the journal.30 Of course, the
"sound science" movement is less concerned with writing style, and
thus focuses on factors in the Ecology list such as "scientific soundness" and "degree to which conclusions are supported." Even in this
respect, however, the intensity of journal and grant peer review is
nothing like de novo review. Ecology explains, for example, that in
assessing "scientific soundness" the reviewer should examine the
methods, data presentation, and statistical design of the paper, but
the instructions do not include engaging in independent data authentication. 3 1 Obviously, peer review would grind itself and journal publication to a screeching halt were it to require peer reviewers to
engage in independent testing and data analysis. Nevertheless, it is
widely believed that even this appellate style review provides tremen32
dous quality-improving benefits to scientific scholarship.
As Holly Doremus has explained, journal and grant peer review is
this "coarse," because journals and grant institutions are interested
mainly in whether the claims made in the paper or proposal fall
within a broad range of publication acceptability or funding merit. 3 3
Grant institutions may be interested, for example, in funding "cuttingedge" research, and journals may be interested in publishing it.
Neither entity, however, is assigned the task of using the science it
28. Id.
29. Id. at 207.
30. PUBLICATIONS OFFICE, ECOLOGICAL SOC'Y OF AM., INSTRUCTIONS FOR REVIEWERS,
at http://www.esapubs.org/esapubs/reviewers-main.htm (revised Mar. 22, 2004).
These criteria are representative of the scientific journal industry in general. See
WELLER, supra note 16, at 160-63.
31. PUBLICATIONS OFFICE, ECOLOGICAL SoC'Y OF AM., INSTRUCTIONS FOR REVIEWERS,
at http://www.esapubs.org/esapubs/reviewers-main.htm (revised Mar. 22, 2004).
As Holly Doremus has explained, "[p]eer reviewers are not expected to authenticate the data presented to them. Rather, their role is to evaluate the methods
employed and the facial plausibility of the conclusions drawn." Doremus, supra
note 6, at 1147.
32. There is some empirical evidence in support of this belief. See WELLER, supra
note 16, at 51-53.
33. See Doremus, supra note 6, at 1147.
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funds or publishes to make policy decisions. This is the principal difference between journal and grant peer review and what the "sound
science" movement has in mind for regulatory peer review.
In regulatory settings, in other words, peer review would most
often involve a review of how an agency used available scientific data
in reaching a policy decision. This requires that conventional scientific peer review be adapted in three respects. First, it will often be
the case that the agency is not actually doing the science that produces the data upon which it relies for its decision, but rather uses
data already made available through other scientific research efforts.
Thus, regulatory peer review will often involve reviewing how the
agency incorporates preexisting scientific knowledge into its own scientific processes. Second, it will not always be the case that the data
upon which the agency relies are the result of peer reviewed studies.
Regulatory peer review, therefore, must also provide some review
function of those studies in the form of an evaluation of the agency's
choices as to which data to use. Next, many regulatory decisions are
not simply extensions of the scientific method-i.e., they involve using
science to inform, but not control, the exercise of the agency's professional policy judgment. Regulatory peer review thus must disentangle
the policy judgment from the underlying science if it is to remain true
to the underlying scientific spirit of peer review.
Although regulatory peer review differs from conventional scientific peer review in these respects, incorporating the basic procedure
and substance of peer review into regulatory frameworks is rather
straightforward. Reviewers could be instructed, for example, to take
into consideration limits on the agency's ability to conduct original scientific studies, to evaluate the soundness of relying on the kind of data
upon which the agency based its decision (e.g., field data versus published peer reviewed studies), and to limit their review to the scientific
component of the agency's decision. Indeed, several federal agencies
have incorporated some form of peer review in their regulatory deci34
sionmaking processes.
The "sound science" movement would implement this model across
the spectrum of regulatory agencies, arguing that what is good for science is good for regulation. The promised benefits of integrating peer
review into the regulatory decisionmaking process are, not surprisingly, both procedural and substantive-i.e., enhancing the legitimacy
of the regulatory process by reducing the appearance of agency bias

34. See Noah, supra note 5, at 1052-57 (discussing the Environmental Protection
Agency, Food and Drug Administration, and Consumer Product Safety
Commission).
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and conflict of interest, 3 5 and improving the quality of regulatory decisions by providing independent expert feedback.36
Many commentators argue, however, that this effort is simply misguided because peer review is inherently incapable of producing for
regulation the same benefits it produces for science. One argument
frequently advanced in this regard is that is that its bias control procedures will not enhance the legitimacy of agency decisions. Holly
Doremus suggests, for example, that peer review of decisions whether
to list species as endangered under the ESA would be redundant or
fruitless:
The agencies' review of the data should already provide the impartial screening mechanism peer review generally offers. If, on the other hand, the agencies' neutrality cannot be trusted, peer review will not help. After all, if the
shared biases of biologists lead to unreliable listing decisions, submitting proposals to additional biologists for review is not likely to improve them.3 7

If the neutrality of agency biologists is not trusted, however-and
this is clearly an underlying premise of the "sound science" movement-it is because they are agency biologists, not because they are
simply biologists. There may be a set of "shared biases" for members
of a discipline such as biology, but there just as surely will be a set of
divergent biases based on the particular experience of each person in
that discipline. Peer review in any context would be pointless if this
were not the case.
Another argument against regulatory peer review is that peer review is simply too coarse substantively to protect against fraud or to
detect all errors. 38 While these points are true, they underplay the
important role of peer review as a force of improvement in final manuscripts and grant proposals. Most journal peer review decisions, for
example, are in the "publish with changes" category-approximately
eighty percent of submitted papers receive this result. 39 Rowland's
study of scientists' perceptions of peer review found that "it is widely
agreed that this improving function by referees is of value in maintaining the overall quality of the scholarly literature."40 Putting aside
for the moment the question of time and resources, which I take up
infra, there is no structural feature of regulatory decisionmaking that
comes to mind that would prevent peer review from producing similar
improving functions in the substantive quality of decisionmaking.
My point here is that there is nothing about peer review in principle that makes it inherently useless in the realm of regulatory deci35. See OMB, Proposed Bulletin, supra note 19, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,024.
36. See Lars Noah, Peer Review and Regulatory Reform, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,606, 10,608 (2000).
37. Doremus, supra note 6, at 1148.
38. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 6, at 1147.
39. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 23, at 1.
40. Id.
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sionmaking. Peer review could lead to improved quality of agency
regulatory decisions, and it could expose biases of agency scientists.
On the surface, therefore, peer review may have something to offer
environmental law in general, and the ESA in particular. Some veteran Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") field personnel believe, in fact,
that "application of peer review to proposed listings and draft recovery
plans has fallen short of its potential to promote scientifically sound
decision making." 4 1 I see the same potential. The problems I see with
regulatory peer review, however, are more practical in nature, having
to do with the ways in which the "sound science" movement proposes
to dose peer review out to regulatory contexts such as the ESA. To
examine that implementation issue, however, one first must have
some background in the regulatory framework into which peer review
is proposed to be inserted. The next Part provides that background for
the ESA.
III.

THE PATIENT: THE ESA CONTEXT FOR REGULATORY
PEER REVIEW42

The ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior, who acts through
the FWS, and the Secretary of Commerce, who acts through the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), to make various decisions
about the status and protection of animal and plant species. 4 3 FWS
and NMFS administer several core programs in that regard, the details of which are explored more fully infra:
* Section 4 authorizes FWS and NMFS to identify "endanfuncgered" and "threatened" species, known as the "listing"
4
tion, 44 and then to designate their "critical habitat." 5
41. Anne Hecht & Mary J. Parkin, Improving Peer Review of Listings and Recovery
Plans Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1269, 1270
(2001) (article submitted September 2000-i.e., during the Clinton
Administration).
42. See supra note 1.
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2000) (defining Secretary); 50 C.F.R. § 424.01 (2000)
(FWS and NMFS joint regulations). FWS generally is responsible for terrestrial
and freshwater species, while NMFS is responsible for marine and anadromous
species. NMFS, a division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), is also known as NOAA Fisheries.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). For a description of the listing process, see LIEBESMAN &
PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 15-20; SELS, supra note 23, at 38-58; SULLINS,
supra note 23, at 11-25; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species
Protection Law, in LAw, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 19.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000). For a description of the critical habitat designation
process, see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 20-24; SELS, supra note
23, at 59-69; SULLINS, supra note 23, at 26-28; Federico Cheever, Endangered
Species Act: CriticalHabitat, in LAw, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23,
at 47; Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of
Critical Habitatfor Species Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 88 (2001).
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" Section 4 also requires FWS and NMFS, once the agency has
listed a species, to develop a "recovery plan" for the species. 4 6
" Section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that actions
they carry out, fund, or authorize do not "jeopardize" the continued existence of listed species or "adversely modify" their
critical habitat.47
* Section 9 requires that all persons, including all private and
public entities subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing "take" of listed species of fish and wildlife.48
" Sections 7 (for federal actions) and 10 (for actions not subject
to Section 7) establish a procedure and criteria for FWS and
NMFS to approve "incidental take" of listed species.49
A reader unfamiliar with the ESA may find its structure quite simple and its application quite straightforward. Indeed, by comparison
to other federal environmental laws, the ESA is streamlined.50 The
core programs seem to fit together logically: identify problem species
and their essential habitat areas; stop public and private actions from
further significantly deteriorating their condition; allow actions that
kill or injure species members only under strict permitting guidelines;
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). For a description of the recovery plan process, see LIEBESMAN
& PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 24-26; SELS, supra note 23, at 71-77; SULLINS,
supra note 23, at 34-18; John M. Volkman, Recovery Planning,in LAW,POLICY,
AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 71.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). For a description of the consultation process, see
Marilyn Averill, Protecting Species through Interagency Cooperation, in LAW,
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 87; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra
note 23, at 27-39; SELS, supra note 23, at 83-103; SULLINS, supra note 23, at
59-86.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the cases developing the legal
standards for what constitutes "take," see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 23,
at 39-45; SELS, supra note 23, at 104-112; SULLINS, supra note 23, at 44-53;
Alan M. Glen and Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 65 (2001); Gina Guy, Take

Prohibitionsand Section 9, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at
191; Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities
"Take" Listed Wildlife UnderESA Section 9 and the "Harm"Regulation?, in LAW,
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 207.
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(1) (2000). "Incidental take," although not the
subject of a specific statutory definition provision, is described elsewhere in the
statute as a take that is "incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of
an otherwise lawful activity." Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The FWS and NMFS have
adopted this meaning for purposes of the regulations implementing Section 7. 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures, see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 46-50; SELS, supra note
23, at 127-73; SULLINS, supra note 23, at 87-102.
50. In one unannotated collection of environmental statutes, the ESA takes up fortyfour pages compared to 181 pages for the Clean Water Act and 304 pages for the
Clean Air Act. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT AND INTERNET GUIDE

(2002).
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figure out ways to help them recover to sustainable populations. As is
often the case with seemingly uncomplicated statutes, however, the
devil is in the details.- Each of the administrative programs outlined
above involves an intersection between the decisionmaking demands
of legal standards and a multitude of scientific determinations that
involve very fluid, unpredictable, and, oftentimes, unascertainable environmental conditions. Consider the following inventory of some of
the coupled law-science decisions FWS and NMFS are required to
make under the ESA:

Program

Legal Standard

Science Questions

Section 4
listing

Is the species in danger of
extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range
(endangered) or likely to become
so in the foreseeable future
(threatened)?5 1

Is it a species? 5 2 What is its
range? What are the present and
threatened injuries to its
habitat?5 3 Is it being overutilized
for commercial or other purposes?
Is it threatened by disease or
predation? Overall, are these
threats enough to cause it to go
extinct? When? What is the
probability?

Section 4
critical
habitat
designation

What habitat is essential to the
conservation of the species and
requires special management
considerations? 5 4

How much space does the species
need for individual and population
growth? 5 5 What are its food,
water, air, light, mineral, shelter,
and other nutritional and
physiological requirements?
Where does it breed, reproduce,
and rear offspring? What are the
constitutive elements of habitat
serving these functions and
needs? Where is such habitat?
How much of it does the species
require?

51. These are the definitions of endangered species and threatened species. See 16
U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (2000).
52. To complicate this question, the ESA defines species as including "any subspecies
of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of
vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." Id. § 1532(16).
53. This and the remaining questions posed for the listing function are taken from
the statutory criteria. See id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E).
54. This is taken from the definition of critical habitat. See id. § 1532(5).
55. This and the other critical habitat designation questions are summarized in the
agency regulations. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(1)-(5) (2003).
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Program

Legal Standard

Science Questions

Section 4
recovery
planning

What measures are necessary to
bring the species to the point at
which it is no longer endangered
or threatened, and by what
objective, measurable criteria can
that determination be made? 5 6

What site-specific and general
management actions can reduce
the threats that caused the
species to be listed?5 7 How will
we measure the magnitude of
those benefits? When will the
benefits have reached the point
that we can justify removing the
species from the lists?

Section 7
jeopardy
prohibitions

Will the direct and indirect effects
of the federal action jeopardize
the continued existence of the
species 5 8 by appreciably reducing
its chances of recovery and
survival in the wild?5 9

What are the impacts of the
action on reproduction, numbers,
60
or distribution of the species?
How much do such impacts reduce
the chances of the species
surviving and recovering in the
wild?

Section 7
adverse
modification
prohibition

Will the direct and indirect effects
of the federal action result in the
destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat of
the species 6 1 by appreciably
diminishing the value of the
habitat for the survival and
recovery of the species? 6 2

How does the action alter any of
the physical and biological
features that were the basis for
determining the habitat to be
critical?6 3 How much do such
impacts reduce the chances of the
species surviving and recovering
in the wild?

56. This is taken from the definition of "conservation," which is what recovery plans
are supposed to accomplish. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(3) (definition of conservation);
1533(f) (recovery plans are for conservation of species).
57. These questions are from the statutory procedure for recovery plan development.
See id. § 1533(f).
58. This is the statutory prohibition of jeopardy. See id. § 1536(a)(2).
59. The agency regulations elaborate on the statute with this definition of
"jeopardize." See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2003).
60. These are the criteria set forth in the regulatory definition. See id.
61. This is the statutory prohibition of adverse modification. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2).
62. The agency regulations elaborate on the statute with this definition of
"destruction or adverse modification." See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
63. These are the criteria set forth in the regulatory definition. See id.
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Program

Legal Standard

Science Questions

Section 9
take
prohibition

Will a person's action harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect any
individuals of the species? 64

Does the action actually kill or
injure wildlife? For the "harm"
determination, does it modify or
degrade habitat so as to impair
behavioral patterns such as
breeding, feeding, or sheltering,
and if so, has that killed or
injured 65
individuals of the
species?

Section 7
incidental
take
permitting

What reasonable and prudent
measures are necessary or
appropriate to minimize the
impact of the incidental taking?66

What is the nature and
magnitude of the take being
authorized, and by what measures
and magnitude has the agency
minimized such take?

Section 10
incidental
take
permitting

Has the applicant minimized and
mitigated the impacts of the
incidental taking to the maximum
extent practicable, and not
appreciably reduced the likelihood
of the survival and recovery of the
species? 6 7

What is the nature and
magnitude of the take being
authorized, and by what measures
and magnitude has the applicant
minimized and mitigated such
take? What is the net effect of the
take, as minimized and mitigated,
on the ability of the species to
survive and recover?

Any one of the questions embedded in the ESA's science-driven legal framework could be unpacked to reveal a wealth of additional inquiries that press even harder on the question of how to make
decisions under the applicable legal standard. For many species, the
series of scientific questions the ESA raises could be the foundation for
years of research by a university or agency scientist, and even with

64. This is the statutory definition of take. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
65. This is the regulatory definition of harm. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2003). For a
recent summary of the history of this administrative interpretation of "harm" and
the caselaw construing it, see Steven G. Davison, The Aftermath of Sweet Home
Chapter: Modification of Wildlife Habitat as a ProhibitedTaking in Violation of
the EndangeredSpecies Act, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 541, 557-69

(2003); Glen & Douglas, supra note 48.
66. This is the statutory standard for issuance of a Section 7 incidental take
statement. See 16 § U.S.C. 1536(b)(4).
67. These are the statutory criteria for issuance of a Section 10 incidental take
permit. See id. § 1539(a)(2).
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68
ample time and resources conclusive answers would remain elusive.
of
Seen from this scientist's perspective, the sharp yes/no6 character
9
preposterous.
seem
must
decisions
regulatory
ESA's
the
Indeed, the gap between what agencies do under the ESA and
what scientists do under science is inevitable. Agencies do not do science under the ESA, they merely use it. This is all the ESA demands
of agencies when it commands that they make decisions on the basis of
the best scientific data available. Unless we want to go so far as to
demand that agencies also use the available science in their decisions
as if they are doing science-i.e., with the same rigors and to the same
level of confidence as the scientific method demands of scientistswhat we really want them to do is use the available science in a manner consistent with sound professional judgment. 70 As the next Part
demonstrates, introducing peer review into that setting can present
more pitfalls than promise.

IV.

THE DANGERS OF PEER REVIEW OVERDOSE

Over the past few years the national media have followed the tumultuous events of ESA implementation in the Klamath River Basin,
which straddles the Oregon-California border. 7 1 There, for over one
68. For example, even the threshold question of whether a species really is a species
in the legal and scientific sense has sparked intense debate. See LIEBESMAN &
PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 11-15; SELS, supra note 23, at 31-38; SULLINS,
supra note 23, at 6-11. Several cases turn on whether FWS or NMFS has correctly defined what constitutes a species within the meaning of the statute. See
LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 11-15 (reviewing cases).
69. As two close observers of the ESA have put it, "the ESA requires scientists to
provide clear answers to fuzzy questions that many scientists do not define as
'scientific,' such as whether a species is endangered or whether a specific project
is likely to cause jeopardy." Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms,and
the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 325 (2003).
70. This is the theme of my contemporaneous work on the methodology of the ESA.
See Ruhl, supra note 12.
71. This brief recitation of the history of events taking place in the Klamath River
Basin is not intended to be comprehensive. It is derived from personal knowledge
and my work on the National Research Council's Committee on Endangered and
Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin, which thoroughly studied the
area's land use and water management history. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
NAT'L ACADEMIES, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER
BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 46-94 (2004) [herein-

after KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT] (describing, in depth, the land use and
water management of the Klamath River area). Additional detail can be found in
Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin
Water and the EndangeredSpecies Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2002); Doremus
& Tarlock, supra note 69; Julia Muedeking, Taking the Heart of the Klamath
Basin:Is It Free?, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 217 (2003); and Cori S. Parobek, Of Farmers' Takes and Fishes'Takings: Fifth Amendment Compensation Claims When the
Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 177 (2003).

,
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hundred years, the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") has operated an
irrigation water diversion project at a dam impounding Upper Klamath Lake. Over that time, however, two species of sucker fish-the
shortnose sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris) and the Lost River sucker
(Deltistes luxatus)-now inhabiting lake and tributary habitat above
the dam, and a population of coho salmon (Oncorhyncus kisutch) inhabiting the river and tributary system below the dam, have dwindled
in population. They have been listed under the ESA and thus are
monitored and protected under the watchful eyes of the FWS (for the
suckers) and NMFS (for the salmon). In 2001, a year of severe
drought, FWS and NMFS concluded that continued flow of irrigation
water out of the system would jeopardize the species in violation of
section 7 of the ESA. The BOR closed the headgates, and hundreds of
farms dried to dust. Following public outcry over this fish-versushumans saga, the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior asked the
National Academy of Science's National Research Council ("NRC") to
convene a committee of experts to conduct a scientifically rigorous
peer review of the agencies' respective decisions-the first ever to be
conducted of a discrete agency decision of this magnitude under the
ESA.72

As a member of the NRC's Committee on Endangered and
Threatened Species of the Klamath River Basin (Klamath Committee), I saw first hand the difference peer review can make for the ESA.
The Klamath Committee's initial charge was to "assess whether the
[FWS and NMFS] biological opinions are consistent with the available
scientific information."73 The Klamath Committee, in other words,
72.

One earlier study purported to conduct some level of scientific peer review of 43

HCP incidental take permits that FWS had issued under section 10 of the ESA
through late 1997. See NAT'L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS &
AM. INST. OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION

PLANS (1999), available at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/nceas-web/projects/
97KAREI2/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf. The methodology of the study, however, did not
produce a rigorous peer review of each HCP, and did not purport to apply the
procedures usually associated with producing independent scientific peer review.
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE'S RESPONSE TO AIBS/NCEAS's STUDY: USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS, available at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/response.htm

(last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
73. The "statement of task" for the Klamath Committee at this juncture thus was
quite narrow, requiring that the group "review and evaluate the science underlying" the agencies' decisions and "assess whether the [decisions] are consistent
with the available scientific information." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMIES, SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON ENDANGERED AND
THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: INTERIM REPORT 32 (2002)
[hereinafter KLAMATH COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT]. All discussion of the Kla-

math Committee's work in this Article reflects my personal views and not those
of the NRC, the Klamath Committee, or any other member of the Klamath

Committee.
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was not filling the shoes of a court on judicial review assessing
whether the biological opinions were "arbitrary and capricious."
Rather, we were asked, in effect, to subject a discrete agency decision
to rigorous, independent, scientific peer review.
The initial results of the Klamath Committee's preliminary peer
review, the so-called Interim Report,74 sparked a firestorm of controversy. The Klamath Committee found, based on an independent, objective, scientifically rigorous review of available information in the
available time period, that "no sound scientific basis" existed for the
two central recommendations that FWS and NMFS made regarding
the most controversial features of the Klamath Project-effects of lake
levels and river flows on the fish.75
Predictably, these findings catapulted the Klamath into the position of exhibit number one for the "sound science" movement, with
"sound science" agitators using the Interim Report conclusions to support charges that the ESA is "scientifically flawed" in that it allows
the agencies to work on the basis of so-called "junk science."7 6 A court
using the conventional rules of judicial review would not, and could
not, apply scientific peer review procedures to the agencies' decisions,
and thus may have upheld FWS and NMFS.77 Hence, goes the argument, we must introduce peer review more systematically into the
ESA in order to avoid more "Klamaths."
Not so fast! The Klamath is only one data point, and sound science
itself would not countenance making sweeping policy decisions on that
sole basis. Even "sound science" wouldn't do that! Before we rush to
judgment about the import of the Klamath experience as evidence
that peer review is needed to stamp out widespread agency failure, we
should consider the potential for peer review to detract from the exercise of agency professional judgment. Three concerns in this respect
74. See id., at 3-4 (summarizing the Committee's principal findings that the agencies
had no scientific basis for requiring increased lake levels or increased stream
flow).
75. Id. (finding no scientific evidence supporting requirement of increased lake levels
or increased stream flow). The Committee also found that BOR's proposed operational changes had no scientific basis. Id. at 4-5.
76. See Chris Mooney, Sucker Punch, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May-June 2004, at 23, 25. The
Klamath Committee also was the target of much criticism and, in general, the
situation deteriorated into what some observers referred to as "combat biology."
Robert F. Service, "Combat Biology" on the Klamath, 300 SCIENCE 36, 36 (2003).
The lack of established structure for carrying out the peer review probably contributed to the ways in which the findings were used and abused, and that is one
reason for my proposal infra.
77. My personal view is that it is almost certain a court would have upheld the FWS
and NMFS biological opinions as not arbitrary and capricious. That likelihood
was severely diminished, if not reversed, by the Klamath Committee's Interim
Report, though events have overtaken the possibility of that precise question ever
being decided.
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are: the problem of inflated public expectations of the benefits of peer
review; the effects the time and expense peer review will have on the
efficiency of agency decisionmaking; and the incentives agencies may
have to manipulate peer review in their favor.
A.

Overselling Peer Review to the Public: The OMB Peer
Review Guidance

The centerpiece of the Bush Administration's "sound science" push
is a policy bulletin the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") has
proposed that purports to require federal agencies to conduct "appropriate and scientifically rigorous peer review" of "influential scientific
information" and "highly influential scientific assessments" an agency
disseminates to the public."78 In its initial September 2003 proposal,
OMB claimed this mandate will "improve the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the Federal Government to the public," because it will "provide a vital second opinion on
the science that underlies federal regulation."79 But this oversold to
the public what regulatory peer review offers. In the first place, peer
review does not provide a second opinion in the conventional sense.
Medical doctors providing a second opinion examine the patient, not
just the other doctor's written opinion; whereas scientists providing
peer review for professional journals do not "examine the patient" in
the form of conducting independent experimentation or data analysis.
As Lars Noah has put it, "policymakers often seem to conflate peer
review with science itself, which in turn may lead them to exaggerate
the possible utility of independent expert scrutiny of decisions based
on science."8o OMB did just that, suggesting to the public that federal
agencies will be providing the results of "second opinions" when in fact
they will be subjecting decisions only to the coarse review commensurate with journal publication and grant-funding peer review. OMB
even conceded that "peer review undertaken by a scientific journal
may generally be presumed to be adequate" to satisfy its peer review
mandate,8 1 yet nonetheless described regulatory peer review to the
public as the equivalent of a "second opinion."
Responding to this and other criticisms of its initial proposal, 8 2
OMB revised the proposal in April 2004,83 deleting any suggestion
78. OMB, Proposed Bulletin, supra note 19, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,027. I describe the
bulletin as purporting to require peer review because some observers have questioned OMB's authority to do so. See Shapiro, supra note 5. I do not take up the
authority question herein.
79. See OMB, Proposed Bulletin, supra note 19, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,023-24.
80. Noah, supra note 5, at 1046.
81. OMB, Proposed Bulletin, supra note 19, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,027.
82. Public comments on the OMB Proposed Bulletin are posted at http/www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/iq-list.html.
83. See OLB,Revised Bulletin, supra note 19, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,231.
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that regulatory peer review is tantamount to a "second opinion." Indeed, OMB succinctly explained what regulatory peer review would
provide in much more cogent terms:
Peer review typically evaluates the clarity of hypotheses, the validity of the
research design, the quality of the data collection procedures, the robustness
of the methods employed, the appropriateness of the methods for the hypotheanalysis,
ses being tested, the extent to which the conclusions follow
8 4 from the
and the strengths and limitations of the overall project.

Even having corrected its case of false advertising, however, OMB
never explains precisely how far the broad peer review mandate will
"improve both the quality of scientific information and the public's
confidence in the integrity of science." I have little doubt that it will
lead to some improvement in all respects, but it is unlikely to do so
significantly in all cases, or even in more than a small percentage.
There are, I suspect, few "Klamaths" lurking out there for which peer
review will turn things around and upside down. The reason is that,
as explained above, agencies already operate under an institutional
framework that provides review functions through public participation and judicial review. Peer review would add only an incremental
review effect, albeit by reviewers who have expertise not necessarily
shared by the public or judiciary. OMB fails to identify the magnitude
of benefits it expects this increment of additional review to produce.
Indeed, the deficiencies in the FWS and NMFS opinions issued in
the Klamath context were revealed only through an intense peer review process-the Interim Report, in which the Committee issued its
initial "without basis" finding, was prepared by a team of twelve experts from several fields working over a ninety-day time frame to examine and evaluate reams of source data and documentation. In
other words, we went far beyond the coarse filter of journal publication peer review, and I strongly doubt a review undertaken at any less
intense level would have uncovered the gaps in reasoning we revealed.
The OMB sells its peer review mandate, however, by suggesting to the
public that it may receive Klamath-style error detection benefits on a
journal peer review budget, and thereby sets up agencies for a fall.
Supporters of OMB's proposal may argue, and I would agree, that
the benefits of regulatory peer review are more likely to be institutional in nature rather than identifiable in discrete cases. In other
words, the prospect of peer review will inherently lead agencies incrementally to improve the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
their work, so that some form of regulatory peer review framework
ultimately may not substantially change the outcome of any single
regulatory decision, but will beneficially influence the way in which all
regulatory decisions are carried out. This clearly is the reason most
scientists believe that peer review is "essential to the integrity of sci84. OMB, Revised Bulletin, supra note 19, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,231.
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entific and scholarly communication."85 As I demonstrate infra, however, the prospect of mandatory peer review-peer review applied
across the board to classes of regulatory decisions without respect to
time, cost, or need-raises other institutional concerns that must be
considered before we can appreciate the net effects on agency
performance.
B.

Using Peer Review to Smother Agencies: The ESA
"Sound Science" Bills

For many ESA stakeholders, the risk of overselling the policy value
of peer review is outweighed by the risk of allowing the ESA to apply
in instances where it should not as a scientific matter. In other words,
peer review might not improve all ESA decisions, but if it can avoid a
few "mistakes" some observers believe it is worth demanding that
agencies do it as part of the decisionmaking routine. Such a rationale
was embodied in the Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002,86 which Representative James Hansen (R-Utah) introduced on May 23, 2002, as one in a long line of so-called ESA
"sound science" bills. In general, this and similar "sound science" proposals 8 7 would alter the procedures, standards of evidence, and burdens of proof, under which federal agencies operate in carrying out
ESA programs. The legislation would "raise the bar" for ESA procedures in many respects, requiring FWS and NMFS to give preference
to certain forms of evidence and apply more rigorous burdens of proof
to a long list of specified decisions. In particular, the bill would institute a more formal and probing peer review step for many more ESA
decisions than the agency has imposed on itself under the 1994 policy.
These changes likely would increase the procedural and financial burdens associated with carrying out the affected functions.
Assuming sufficient time and resources to allow the agencies to
carry out diligently the new requirements, it is possible that, by enhancing the evidentiary record and burden of proof, the changes would
reduce agency error in carrying out those functions. Indeed, like
OMB, the ESA "sound science" bill proponents routinely liken regulatory peer review to getting a second opinion from a doctor:
If you went to a doctor and he said to you, "we are going to have to take off
your right leg," you'd probably want a second opinion. Right now under the

85. WELLER, supra note 16, at 322.
86. H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
87. For a more recent version, see S. 369, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003), and H.R.
1662, 108th Cong. (lst Sess.) (2003). For a history of peer review in ESA reform
bills preceding HR 4840, see Brennan et al., supra note 11, at 433-40.
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have the chance to
Endangered Species Act, plants, animals and people don't
88
seek a second opinion; you just get cut off at the knees.

Folksy wisdom indeed, but in fact few people seek a second opinion
for, say, a hangnail-the point being that not every ESA decision is
the regulatory equivalent of cutting off a right leg. "Klamaths" don't
happen every day. But the ESA "sound science" bills make no distinction based on diagnosis-all listings, critical habitat designations, recovery plans, and jeopardy consultations are, for their purposes, limb
amputations necessitating a second opinion. Even if regulatory peer
review were to provide a true second opinion, which it won't (see
supra), it would be wasteful to require it in every case.
With this kind of fast and loose portrayal of why regulatory peer
review is needed for the ESA, "sound science," I would say, is beginning to look like something other than sound science. It is beginning
to look like sandbagging, which, in fact, is the chief accusation made
against proponents of regulatory peer review. The "paralysis by analysis" charge leveled against broad, mandatory regulatory peer review
alleges that "these sorts of reform proposals are designed for precisely
relief for industry in the guise of
that purpose, offering regulatory
89
more rational procedures."
Indeed, there is good evidence that this smothering effect is the
intended consequence of proposals for mandatory peer review under
the ESA. As noted above, most of the "sound science" bills apply their
version of science primarily to agency decisions that involve the extension of protection to species, such as listing of species under section 4
and the finding of jeopardy under section 7, and not to decisions to
allow development, such as the issuance of incidental take permits
under section 10.90 The "sound science" bill proponents could hardly
commit a more obvious tipping of the hand, reserving the purported
"second opinion" benefits of peer review for the decisions they dislike
the most. Surely they understand that the clear effect of altering the
decisionmaking methodology will be to alter some, if not many, substantive outcomes.
To be fair in this criticism, though, studies have shown that support for peer review under the ESA is strong in both the industry and
the environmental camps and is almost always limited to applying the
review to the type of decisions each interest group finds the most
troublesome. Dr. Deborah Brosnan has found, for example, that more
88. Walden Testifies on Need for EndangeredSpeciesAct Reform (Feb. 4, 2004) (testimony of Rep. Greg Walden (R-Or), bill sponsor of H.R. 1662), at http://www.
house.gov/appslist/press/or02_Walden/pr_040205_esa.html.
89. Noah, supra note 5, at 1068. See also Randolph J. May, OMB's Peer Review Proposal-Swamped By Science?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2004, at 4, 4-5
(describing mandatory peer review as "an invitation for regulatory ossification").
90. See H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
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than sixty prominent lobbying groups representing a diverse array of
interests actively supported using peer review under the ESA, but
that "each group favors review of actions that it finds unpalatable.
Development groups want fewer species listings and therefore demand review of listing decisions ....
Environmental groups are concerned about habitat loss under HCPs and want them independently
reviewed."91 Even those favoring increased species protection, in
other words, are willing to use peer review as a strategic weapon.
Of course, strategic sandbagging can be reduced though adequate
funding, ample time frames, and even-handed implementation practices. But even if Congress were, contrary to all indications, adequately to fund ESA peer review and eliminate political bias by
mandating peer review across the board for all types of decisions, the
result could be to actually increase agency error rates. Time deadlines
for ESA decisions do make sense-species on their way to extinction
do not have time to spare-thus Congress wisely imposed time limits
for listing and jeopardy decisions. 9 2 If mandatory peer review were
enforced under the ESA in those settings, the lack of complete data
about imperiled species, compounded by the lack of time sufficient to
collect more complete data before the possibility of extinction grows
larger, would mean that most peer reviews would find that proposed
decisions to protect species rest on thin scientific footings.93 If such a
finding were to make it more difficult for the agency to extend protection to species as a matter of policy, mandatory peer review could create a structural risk asymmetry in the ESA, under which "the
probability that the species will not be protected when protection is
needed is greater than the probability that the species will be protected unnecessarily." 94
In other words, even with adequate funding and uniform application across all ESA programs, some species simply do not have the
time that peer review and other components of sound science demand.
If a species is endangered, it is past the "limb amputation" stage
where a second opinion makes sense. Second opinions, after all, are
not usually called for on the battlefield. Indeed, the deadlines Congress has placed in the ESA on agency decisionmaking acknowledge
the pressing need in many cases to intervene quickly on behalf of species, lest they vanish before we decide what to do. The agencies al91. Deborah M. Brosnan, Can PeerReview Help Resolve Natural Resource Conflicts?,
16 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 32, 33 (2000).
92. See supra notes 44 and 45.
93. I take up infra the fact that the peer review program FWS has imposed on itself
as an agency policy has produced overwhelmingly affirmative peer reviews findings. See infra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. When things appear too
good to be true, perhaps something is amiss.
94. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMIES, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 167 (1995).
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ready have a difficult time meeting those deadlines,9 5 and adding peer
review steps to the process will not improve that experience. Over
time, therefore, under a mandatory peer review regime, we most likely
would experience even more errors of omission than of commissioni.e., we will amass more species that should have been protected, but
were not, than those which should not have been protected, but were.
In the end, mandatory ESA peer review might not smother only the
agencies, but the endangered species too.
C.

Rigging Peer Review to Validate Decisions: The ESA
Peer Review Policy

One of the arguments advanced against the ESA "sound science"
bills is that FWS and NMFS already incorporate peer review a policy
that FWS and NMFS adopted in 1994 and have implemented with
respect to ESA species listing and recovery plan decisions. 9 6 Peer review, however, should satisfy four key characteristics-it must be expert, independent, external, and technical. 9 7 The NRC takes great
care to ensure these qualities in its peer review procedures by carefully soliciting expert reviewers, vetting them for bias, and even subjecting their initial report to another level of peer review. 98 Although
many stakeholders disagreed with the Klamath Committee's conclusions and how the Departments of Interior and Commerce incorporated them into policy, no allegations were heard that the committee
somehow was influenced by bias. The same cannot be said of peer
reviews carried out under the ESA peer review policy.
In the ESA policy, the agencies explain that they will "incorporate
independent peer review in listing and recovery activities."99 This
step, they explain, will involve "[s]olicit[ing] the expert opinions of
three appropriate and independent specialists regarding pertinent scientific or commercial data and assumptions relating to the taxonomy,
population models, and supportive biological and ecological information for species under consideration for listing."10 0 The problem is
that, although the agencies reassuringly explain that "[ilndependent
peer reviewers should be selected from the academic and scientific
community, Tribal and other Native American groups, Federal and
95. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-93, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MORE
FEDERAL MANAGEMENT PROTECTION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION
PROCESS (2003) (explaining how frequently the agencies exceed deadlines applicable to consultation under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA).
96. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg.

34,270, 34,270 (July 1, 1994).
97. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 2.
98. See, e.g., KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 71, at xiii-xiv.
99. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 2.

100. Id.
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State agencies, and the private sector,"o1 and that "those selected
have demonstrated expertise and specialized knowledge related to the
scientific area under consideration,"10 2 it is the agencies that select
their peer reviewers, review the peer reviews, and report the results of
10 3
the peer reviews.
Whether these conditions can ensure expert, independent, external, and technical peer review is no idle concern. A recent General
Accounting Office ("GAO") study of how FWS has implemented the
peer review policy noted that "Service officials told us that they have
not adopted a formal procedure to assess peer reviewers' independence, and the Service does not publicly disclose ... potential conflicts
or prior involvement by its peer reviewers" and concluded that other
agencies "use more rigorous forms of peer review."' 0 4 The study also
found that the people FWS chose to serve as peer reviewers usually
agreed with the agencies' positions.10 5 Yet, with virtually no information at hand with which to test the independence of peer reviewers,
one cannot reliably conclude from this seemingly strong track record
whether FWS subjected its decisions to peer review and received consistently good marks, or simply sought peer approval and ensured the
process would produce plenty. The GAO observed that FWS "peer reviewers are selected at the discretion of the field office scientists responsible for developing listing and critical habitat decisions."10 6 This
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Reclassify and Remove the Grey Wolf from the Endangered and Threatened Wildlife in
Portions of the Conterminous United States; Establishment of Two Special Regulations for Threatened Grey Wolves, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,804, 15,819-20 (Apr. 1,
2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (discussing FWS's use of the peer review
process in connection with a decision about the status of gray wolves (Canis
lupus)).
104. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-803, ENDANGERED SPECIES: FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE LISTING DECISIONS,
BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED FOR CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS 15-16

(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03803.pdf.
105. Id. at 21-22.
106. Id. at 15. By contrast, the NRC peer review policy, under which the Klamath
Committee was formed, provides:
The Research Council does not permit governmental agencies that sponsor projects to select committee members because of the institution's
commitment to ensuring independence and objectivity in carrying out its
work. However, sponsors can and often do suggest nominees, some of
whom may be selected. Such a selection could be made when the individuals nominated by a sponsor have the expertise, knowledge, and stature required and can be expected to participate in a committee's work
without being subjected to undue influence or pressure from the sponsoring agency.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMIES, THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

PROCESS (2004), at http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/faq4.html. Because
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simply invites charges of manipulation. Indeed, even putting aside
the possibility of self-serving motives, the agencies' peer review policy
generally fits the type of sloppy, ad hoc model many observers, and
not just "sound science" advocates, find objectionable in administra10 7
tive agency practice.
Some experiences with FWS and NMFS peer review suggest that
these general concerns have manifested with suspect consequences in
specific cases. FWS and NMFS had long been criticized for operating
a "black box" style of decisionmaking-relatively closed to the public,
relying on informal channels of scientific communication, and generally unwilling to communicate their data and scientific reasoning in a
manner that facilitated review by the public and the courts.1 0 8 The
peer review policy, presumably, was intended to fix that-to instill
greater confidence in the public and the courts. But the holes in the
policy have allowed the agencies to perpetuate "black box" practices.
In listing decisions, for example, FWS has refused to release the
names and reports of peer reviewers prior to its listing decision, thus
precluding the peer review results from informing public comment,
and has often selected peer reviewers whose work formed the basis of
the agency's decisions, meaning that the peer reviewer was asked to
review his or her work.1 0 9 In other cases, the agency has simply ignored the peer reviewers' comments, reaching a decision contrary to
what peer review concluded is the best available science. 1 10 Overall,
therefore, the ESA peer review policy may lead to review of FWS and
NMFS decisions, perhaps by peers, and even by peers who are scientists, but its independence and objectivity are inherently suspect as
well as tainted by actual experience.

107.

108.
109.

110.

of the consequences peer review would have under my proposal with regard to
judicial review, I would require that the NRC appointment procedures be used.
See, e.g., OMB, Proposed Bulletin, supra note 19, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,024-25 (discussing the flaws in different federal agency peer review procedures that lead to
reduced reliability and credibility of the reviews, but not going so far as to require
NRC's appointment procedures, discussed supra note 106).
See Doremus, supra note 6, at 1082-87.
See Letter from Robert D. Thornton, to Craig Manson, FWS Assistant Secretary,
Re: California Tiger Salamander (Feb. 18, 2003) (detailing these claims in the
context of a proposed listing deision) (on file with author and available in the
Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law.).
See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List the Mountain Plover as Threatened, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,083,
53,093 (Sept. 9, 2003); Mountain Plover Listing Proposal Withdrawn, ENDANGERED SPECIES & WETLANDS REP., Sept 2003, at 16. In the Mountain plover decision, FWS proposed a rule listing the species as endangered, which the agency's
hand-picked peer reviewers agreed was supported by the best available science.
The agency later withdrew the proposal based on what it described as "additional
information," but without subjecting the new agency decision to peer review.
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A PRESCRIPTION FOR USEFUL REGULATORY
PEER REVIEW

What does the Klamath experience have to say about the use of
peer review under the ESA? Some observers have argued that the
Klamath experience proves that without peer review the agencies
practice "junk science."1 1 1 Nonsense! If that charge is true, it is true
of virtually every other environmental law, for any decisionmaking
process is bound eventually to make mistakes that might have been
detected through ever more rigorous peer review. Rather, all the Interim Report demonstrates in the way of broader policy questions is
that there is a decision to be made about peer review-when and
where to use it, and at what level of intensity. The Klamath Committee revealed that the agencies, while perhaps exercising sound professional judgment in their biological opinions (something the Klamath
Committee was not asked to decide), did not produce a decision that
passed what happened to be a particularly rigorous peer review.
Those who charge the agencies with practicing "junk science" on that
basis either have no idea what sound science is or are simply being
dishonest about their true intent-to influence the substantive outcomes of the ESA process by demanding that the agencies satisfy
"sound science." As the Klamath Committee observed in its Final
Report:
[A]gencies charged with ESA responsibilities can be expected to use professional judgment when no scientifically supportable basis is available for a decision, or where they judge the scientific support to be inadequate. Thus, the
agencies may recommend practices for which the committee would find virtually no direct scientific support. The committee acknowledges the necessity of
is inadequate for developthis practice in many situations where information
112
ment of scientifically rigorous decisions.

The challenge, in other words, is to craft peer review procedures
that assist agency exercise of professional judgment, not interfere
with it. At one end of the spectrum is the OMB-like prescription of
mandatory peer review applied across the board to all regulatory decisions, an approach I hope to have demonstrated supra to be unwise at
best. At the other end of the spectrum (short of no peer review at all),
some observers suggest allowing agencies to employ ad hoc procedures
for deciding when peer review is appropriate. 1 13 I am fearful, however, that this would politicize peer review, and undermine its legitimacy by making its availability subject to agency discretion-the
same problem the ESA peer review policy has had. What is needed
then, is a more measured approach to regulatory peer review, but one
111. I certainly heard this repeatedly as a member of the Klamath Committee after
NRC released the Interim Report.
112. KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 35.
113. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 5.
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that puts the decision to use it and how to conduct it outside of the
agencies' hands.
A starting point is to remind ourselves what benefits we hope to
derive from having any regulatory peer review at all. One objective is
to avoid decision "disasters" such as the Kiamath experience-i.e.,
where discrete agency decisions have potential consequences to species or society of extremely high magnitude. The other objective is to
promote the background quality improving effect peer review can have
on decisionmaking, but without generating the decision paralysis effect of broad-based mandated peer review.
The first objective can be met by defining a set of conditions which,
when present, would lead any reasonable observer to value a "second
opinion," and then to provide a peer review process as rigorous as that
used in the Klamath context. Screening criteria could be based on economic impact, precedent-setting nature of the proposal, and level of
controversy surrounding the proposal. By setting the criteria high
enough to screen out most proposals, the few proposals that would
trigger intensive peer review would justify the expense. For example,
for a fraction of the $650,000 total budget, the Klamath Committee
was able within ninety days to conclude its initial peer review of the
agency decisions (our remaining work was devoted to broader evaluation of the Klamath River Basin). This does not seem too high a price
to pay to add a layer of insurance against faulty decisionmaking that
presents an appreciable risk of drastic consequences.
The second objective presents a less straightforward challengeuntil one considers what lies behind the quality-improving function of
peer review in the publication setting. Presumably, journal peer review has "lifted" the quality of scholarship not only through the direct
effect of reviewer comments, but also through the deterrent effect
presented by the fact that each author knows his or her article will be
reviewed. As regulators well know, however, deterrent effects can be
realized even when compliance inspections are conducted less than
one hundred percent of the time for fewer than one hundred percent of
the regulated facilities. In the same way, a standing panel of experts
could conduct peer reviews of a random sample of manuscripts-or for
our purposes, proposed ESA regulatory actions-and thereby generate
significant deterrence of shoddy submissions for the entire industry.
In the regulatory setting, these peer reviews would not have to be as
intense as the "microscope" level of review applied to the high-risk decisions, but rather could approximate the standards of journal publication peer review so as to reduce costs and delays. The random
sample element applied over a continuous stream of decisions would
remove any concern as to selection bias and would further mitigate
any sandbagging effect on the agency at programmatic levels.
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As to procedure, both categories of peer review would be implemented by an independent entity (e.g., the NRC) so as to ensure the
integrity of the process. Peer reviewers would be compensated so as to
attract competent experts and improve timely performance, vetted for
potential bias by the coordinating entity, and kept anonymous to the
decisionmaking agency except in cases in which the reviewers' desire
to conduct field investigation and interviews preclude the ability to
ensure anonymity. The results of peer review would be released to the
public prior to conclusion of any public notice and comment procedures applicable to the underlying decision.
Overall, by ensuring expert, independent, external, and technical
peer review of the "big" cases and a sample of the "small" cases, my
proposal can deliver substantial peer review benefits without resorting to false advertising, without risk of smothering agency work, and
without even the appearance of manipulation. It would be impractical
to import journal publication peer review for all regulatory decisions,
yet it is just as improvident to resist peer review in all cases. Rather,
as I have tried to do, we ought to write the prescription to fit the
patient.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The regulatory peer review question is just one component, albeit
perhaps the most prominent component, of the larger "sound science"
debate. And the "sound science" debate, in turn, is embedded in the
even broader question of "[w]hat is the optimal level of sensitivity for
society's environmental alarm." 1 14 In other words, how much "error"
are we willing to tolerate on behalf of exercising caution towards the
environment? Peer review, its advocates promise, will weed out error
in the environmental decisionmaking process, thus making environmental policy more efficient. But will peer review also quiet alarms
that should have rung, and which we will know should have rung only
long after it is too late?
Certainly there is no universally true answer for these questions,
simply because there is no universally standard case in environmental
policy. Peer review, as "medicine" for too much caution, has no standard dose. Recognizing this-that different diagnoses call for different doses-I have proffered two uses of peer review designed to adjust
its use and intensity in the ESA context to the circumstances that
seem most amenable to benefiting from the advantages that peer review can offer. First, when the potential cost to society of extending
protection are high, focused, rigorous peer review can promote focused, rigorous decisionmaking. Second, limited, random "SWAT
114. See S.W. Pacala et al., False Alarm over Environmental False Alarms, 301 SciENCE 1187 (2003).
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team" peer review pitched at the conventional journal publication
level of intensity may provide a sufficient background level of review
to foster, through deterrence of poorly conducted decisionmaking,
much of the quality-improving effects for regulation that are thought
to be enjoyed in scholarship as a result of peer review. Neither of
these uses of peer review, however, presents strong concerns regarding what are identified as the pitfalls of regulatory peer review-overselling, sandbagging, and rigging. I may have missed something,
however, so I am pleased to offer the proposal as the subject of peer
review. Have at it!

